Can Biden afford to give up on the Iran nuclear deal?

December 17, 2022

EU: No better option than JCPOA

The Iran nuclear deal has the feel these days of the Halloween movie series. Just as you can never count on Michael Myers being truly dead, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) seems to have an endless stream of lives and sequels.

Less than two weeks ago Rob Malley, the Biden administration’s Iran envoy, said that because Tehran is “not interested” in the JCPOA, the US is “focused on other things,” such as “trying to deter and disrupt the provision of weapons to Russia and trying to support the fundamental aspirations of the Iranian people.”

But what if Iran is interested again?

On Dec. 9, following a call with Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and UN-mandated coordinator of the JCPOA negotiations, Iran Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian tweeted that “we are on the way to the final stage of a good, strong durable agreement.”

Three days later Borrell, briefing the EU Foreign Affairs Council, said, “We do not have a better option than the JCPOA to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.” He added, “This remains in our own interest.”

Borrell said the EU should separate the human rights-Russia-drones and JCPOA files, calling for continued engagement with Iran “as much as possible” on the nuclear file, despite the current stalemate.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry responded to the EU on the JCPOA by saying that “Iran’s aim is to sign a lasting agreement” and “is prepared to conclude the talks in line with the draft of the Vienna negotiations, which were the result of months of hard and intensive discussions.”

Iran soon after agreed to the visit of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation on Dec. 18 to attempt to resolve a longstanding dispute regarding potential Iranian violations of the nuclear safeguards agreement (read the latest IAEA report here).

Regional contacts and officials are also telling us that Iran is indeed signaling renewed interest in closing the nuclear deal. There may be skepticism of Iran’s intentions, but the stakes are too high not to take to note of what appears to be a possible shift in Tehran’s position.

Iran may want to change the conversation

As protests continue in Iran, the Islamic Republic finds it easier to single out enemies abroad, rather than its own reactionary policies, as cause of the unrest. Criticism and sanctions by the US and the EU are seen as part of a campaign, which includes especially Israel and Saudi Arabia, to destabilize the Islamic Republic. Tehran can’t be seen as giving in at home or abroad in its policies while under siege.

For Iran’s clerical rulers, the die may be cast, and the government will remain in a perpetual state of tension and conflict with wide segments of its population, especially women and youth. Thus, it might be time to try to change the conversation back to the nuclear deal. The economic payoff for Iran, through unfrozen assets and lifting of energy and financial sanctions, would be substantial, as we explain here.

There also may be a sense among some of Iran’s more pragmatic leaders that they blew it in August, a month before protests broke out following the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini for a hijab violation. A deal was close last summer, but talks broke down after Iran introduced the safeguards issue and asked for even more guarantees in case the US again withdraws from the deal, as former US President Donald Trump did in 2018.

Netanyahu and the Iran deal

The return of Benjamin Netanyahu, a committed opponent of the nuclear deal, as Israel’s prime minister, may also be an incentive for Tehran to return to negotiations. Netanyahu told the Saudi media outlet Al-Arabiya this week that he will do whatever he can to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, even without Washington’s consent.

Iran’s leaders would not admit it, but they probably consider a deepening of Israeli-Saudi security coordination against Iran a disaster, especially given the present situation.

Both Iran and Israel interestingly flashed some realism this year with the signing of US-brokered Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary agreement in October. As we wrote here, that agreement is essentially an Iranian deal, if two steps removed, via the Lebanese government and Hezbollah. Netanyahu, in the Al-Arabiya interview, reiterated his commitment to abide by the deal, despite his criticism of it during the election campaign (Ben Caspit had it here first).

Ben Caspit has the exclusive this week that Israel’s intelligence leadership sees lasting change as a result of the protests, but, so far, none of the telltale signs that the government is about to fall.

Regime change is a high bar. Fragile autocratic states under extended siege rarely end with a democratic turnaround. There are numerous cases, none directly comparable, except as an analytical caution: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, etc.

Can Biden embrace realism on Iran?

US President Joe Biden made a return to the Iran nuclear deal a top administration priority. He has said repeatedly that he will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon on his watch, and that diplomacy is the best approach to meet that goal.

The incentive for a deal should be as strong as ever. Nuclear diplomacy has never been about rewarding the Iranian government nor investing in its changing for the better. It was and is about keeping Iran from getting the bomb, and the consequences of what would follow if it did, including the possibility of a regional nuclear arms race.

The IAEA, and the international community, is alarmed that Iran has increased the level of its uranium enrichments to 60%, which is one technical step away from 90%, weapons-grade enrichment level.

The Biden administration has been careful to say that it has not given up on the JCPOA, just that it has “other priorities.” The deal on the table in August, which technically still stands, is the US/EU-approved draft. A return to the talks, of course, starts with Iran. But if Iran gets interested again, the US should as well, reinstating the JCPOA among the “other priorities.”