Netanyahu, peacemaker or troublemaker?

Also, Netanyahu did not go to war. He did not make good on his promise to invade the Gaza Strip and bring down Hamas, he did not engage with Hezbollah in Lebanon — unlike his predecessor Ehud Olmert — and practiced military restraint. Netanyahu is not adventurous and he fears military entanglements, which makes him one of the most defense-oriented prime ministers in Israeli history. He approves far fewer operations across enemy lines than did Olmert and avoids unnecessary risks, especially after the fiasco of the attempted assassination in Jordan of Hamas leader Khaled Mashal 13 years ago. Mossad chiefs and special ops commanders know how hard they have to work to convince Netanyahu to sign off on a complex or risky operation. It is not a matter of his being less courageous than Olmert and his predecessor, the late Ariel Sharon; he is simply less willing to gamble on his future. In Israel, military entanglement is a sure-fire way to political exile or a commission of inquiry. Netanyahu has reduced the chances of such outcomes to a minimum.

On his worldview, Netanyahu’s is a complex personality. As the son of a staunch Zionist revisionist — historian Benzion Netanyahu — he was weaned on right-wing ideology. Over time, his thinking became more nuanced. His current ideology is personal: He truly believes that he must continue to serve as Israel’s prime minister in order to ensure the survival of the Jewish state. Netanyahu is convinced that only he can lead Israel to a safe harbor. His wife Sara Netanyahu said as much, quite clearly and often, including in taped remarks she made 20 years ago. His belief and that of his associates and voters that he is a version of a modern-day Messiah allows him to mold his ideology according to his political needs. When he needs support from the political right, he breaks to the right. When he finds himself corralled by circumstances that require concessions and agreements, he veers to the left, and so on.

A 2001 event provides a glimpse of his true beliefs. At the time, Netanyahu was “between jobs,” after being defeated in the 1999 elections and bowing out of politics. He went to the West Bank settlement of Ofra to visit Geula Hershkovitz, who had lost her husband and son in a terror attack during the second intifada. He arrived with a single aide and asked that the cameras be turned off. His fascinating conversation with the widow and her family, which was taped unbeknownst to him (available on YouTube), was enlightening.

Netanyahu started out talking about international support for Israel, including American support. “I know what America is. America is something that can easily be moved. Moved to the right direction. They say they are for us, but, it’s like … They won’t get into our way. On the other hand, if we do something, they say something. Eighty percent of the Americans support us, it’s absurd. … That administration [Clinton’s] was extremely pro-Palestinian, I was not afraid to maneuver there, I was not afraid to clash with Clinton, I was not afraid to clash with the UN. I was paying the price anyway, I preferred to receive the value. Value for the price.”

Netanyahu was then asked why he had not abrogated the Oslo Accord when he took office in 1996. His explanation was illuminating. He could not have abrogated the agreement, he explained, but he interpreted it in a way that allowed him to stop the withdrawals from West Bank territory and the gallop toward the 1967 borderlines. He interpreted the “military sites” from which Israel would not withdraw as “security zones,” thereby greatly expanding the areas over which Israel could maintain control under terms of the agreement. The Jordan Valley in its entirety, for example, was declared a “security zone.” In other words, Netanyahu did not rescind the Oslo Accord, he simply left it up in the air, waiting for it to dry up and collapse. And that was what happened, indeed. He managed to hold onto the stick at both ends — to avoid risking his political and international standing by abrogating an agreement Israel had signed, but to block its progress and starve it of oxygen until it expired.

Netanyahu once explained that Israel could be generous in making longitudinal concessions, but it must not withdraw sideways. In other words, giving up the Sinai Peninsula was possible; conceding the Golan Heights could be possible, too; but any concession of lands in the West Bank (sideways) given Israel’s geographic narrowness is a distinct threat to national security. He will therefore conduct eternal negotiations, exhaust his rivals, maneuver endlessly and eventually ink only what he absolutely must, or whatever he gets free, without giving much in return.

That is what occurred in Washington this week. Netanyahu signed an agreement that does not end war, but also does not entail territorial concessions, maintaining his peacemaker image without undermining the right-wing rhetoric that keeps his electoral base loyal. Netanyahu, unlike most people, manages to have a cake and eat it, too.