Why is Turkey acquiescing to Egypt’s role in Libya?

Amid the fast-moving events, Turkey focused on keeping the GNA from unraveling. As a result, Bashagha, whose influence draws on the Misratan forces, was reinstated. Yet Sarraj irritated Ankara by moving to diversify his foreign ties, while reinforcing his position at home. Having already replaced the chief of general staff, Sarraj sought to tighten his grip over security, intelligence and media bodies, promoting figures who irked the Muslim Brotherhood and Misratan groups and even triggered calls for civil disobedience. 

Since the Sarraj-Bashagha showdown, many have tended to see an anti-Turkish move in any step Sarraj takes. He seemed to back off from a meeting in Paris, to which Saleh and Hifter were invited as well, after his apparent willingness to attend sparked questioning of his loyalty to Ankara. But Bashagha, too, has been courting France and Egypt, despite leaning on Turkey. 

Either way, both actors remain in need of Turkey’s support at present, as evidenced by Sarraj’s Sept. 6 visit to Ankara, shortly after Bashagha’s trip to Turkey that had coincided with his suspension. Sarraj was the one to sign the maritime demarcation deal with Ankara in November 2019, reportedly under Turkish pressure and fears of Tripoli falling to Hifter. The accord, which became a mainstay of Turkey’s gas exploration claims in the eastern Mediterranean, remains without a parliamentary ratification and its survival depends on the survival of the GNA. 

On top of all those controversies, Sarraj announced Sept. 16 a desire “to hand over [his] duties to the next executive authority no later than the end of October.” Referring to the settlement efforts, he expressed hope that “the dialogue committee will complete its work and choose a new presidential council and prime minister.” 

By speaking of stepping down while trying to consolidate power, Sarraj is believed to be trying to get rid of pressures ahead of prospective peace talks in Geneva. For Ankara, his announcement resonates as a warning: “If I’m gone, the maritime accord is gone as well.” The move, however, might stoke the infighting in Tripoli.

In sum, the balance among its Libyan allies is too fragile to allow Ankara to steer them as it wishes. This, in turn, makes it all the more difficult for Ankara to steer the dialogue between its allies and their eastern opponents. 

Delegations from the House of Representatives and Tripoli’s High State Council held five-day talks in Morocco last week, reaching some understandings on power-sharing. The talks sparked objections from several dozen members of both bodies, who complained about the composition of their respective delegations. Khaled Mishri, head of the High State Council who is close to Turkey, said the talks were of consultative nature and not binding for the council.

Also last week, representatives of Sarraj and Saleh held talks in Cairo, agreeing to set a date for elections no later than October 2021, restructure the GNA’s Presidential Council on the basis of a 3+1 formula — one president and two deputies and an independent prime minister — and address economic issues such as wealth management and equitable distribution of resources.

The Cairo meeting followed Sarraj’s latest visit to Ankara, where the mood was far from upbeat. Cairo’s emergence as a platform for reconciliation is not something that Ankara prefers, but also not something that it is seeking to prevent. Turkey’s flexibility can be attributed to several reasons. Above all, Ankara realizes that Libya’s main oil fields have gone beyond its reach after the Russian buildup in Sirte and al-Jufra and that it will now remain stuck in the Tripoli-Misrata enclave. And with the fragile coalition in Tripoli creaking, Ankara has no option but to give way to negotiations.

In return for acquiescing to Egypt’s role, Turkey hopes to make certain gains, namely the sidelining of Hifter as a solution partner and the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) exclusion from the settlement process. 

The talks in Cairo were limited to representatives of Saleh and Sarraj, thus meeting Ankara’s reservation on Hifter. And if Egypt’s mediation would push back the role of the UAE, the chief sponsor of the 14-month siege on Tripoli, that would be a lesser evil for Ankara, which sees Emirate interference in its areas of interest as more dangerous.

Another factor compelling Turkey to acquiesce to Egypt’s role is Russia’s influential posture on the ground. It was Russia’s delicate engineering that raised Saleh’s profile on the eastern camp at the expense of Hifter. Hence, Russia is Turkey’s only channel to exert influence on the eastern forces.

Last but not least, breaking the ice with Egypt in Libya might give Turkey room to maneuver to pull Egypt away from Greece, its chief adversary in the eastern Mediterranean. Last month, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan revealed ongoing contacts with Egypt on the level of intelligence officials amid growing calls in Turkey, led by influential retired generals, to mend fences with Egypt and Israel to break Turkey’s isolation in the eastern Mediterranean. While Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood — Cairo’s archenemy — remains a fundamental stumbling block, Turkey’s allies in Libya, too, acknowledge that Egypt is a crucial neighbor and has legitimate security concerns.