Did Netanyahu find his legacy with UAE deal?
As revealed in a previous Al-Monitor article, Berkowitz’s talks here over a month ago made clear that annexation was not a feasible option. Berkowitz, acting at the behest of President Donald Trump’s top aide and son-in-law Jared Kushner, made clear that if Israel wants to annex 30% of the West Bank, it would have to hand the Palestinians 6.5% of Area C (the 60% of the West Bank under complete Israeli control). Netanyahu was willing to give up only 0.5%. The Americans rejected his offer out of hand. The prime minister refused to commit publicly to implementation of Trump’s “deal of the century” for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which also entails eventual establishment of a Palestinian state of sorts, and everyone realized the annexation plan was dead in the water. It was time to chart a new course and salvage some achievement from the ruins of the annexation dream. That achievement was declared on Aug. 13: Israel and the UAE came out of the cupboard and placed their relationship on a formal footing.
In a twist of fate, much of the credit for this breakthrough goes to Netanyahu’s government partners, former military chiefs Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi and Defense Minister Benny Gantz, leader of the centrist Blue and White party. Without them, there would not have been any official agreement with the UAE for the simple reason that they both took pains to block the annexation plans.
Although their efforts on this score were downplayed publicly to avoid angering Netanyahu, their influence was crucial. As soon as they took office in May — Gantz as defense minister and alternate prime minister and Ashkenazi as foreign minister — they made clear to the Trump administration that from then on, the Israeli government was no longer a one-man show, and it had two addresses. At the second address, Gantz and Ashkenazi expressed opposition to unilateral annexation and a preference for minimal annexation based on maximal negotiations, including a generous compensation package for the Palestinians. Berkowitz demanded that package of Netanyahu, who turned him down and paved the way for the alternative route.
In the evening hours of Aug. 13, Netanyahu faced the cameras seeking to project the air of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin after his signing of Israel’s 1994 peace treaty with Jordan and of Prime Minister Menachem Begin after his signing of the landmark 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. Netanyahu has earned this pose, although the deal with the small, distant principality that has never been at war with Israel is not comparable to the momentous peace treaties with two key enemy states on Israel’s doorstep.
Despite his self-aggrandizing declarations, Netanyahu knows the deal will erode his support among the settlers, his most important core constituency. It could boost his nonessential constituency on the center-left, but will weaken his domestic one (his Likud and settler base). All he can do now is wait for the polls. If his numbers continue to decline, he will think twice before risking elections. If the polls indicate a recovery, we may see Israelis going to the ballot boxes later this year, for the fourth time in 18 months.
Aug. 25 is the deadline for this crucial choice, the date on which the law stipulates the automatic disbanding of the legislature, resulting in new elections if lawmakers fail to approve the state budget. As always, Netanyahu will decide at the last minute, torn all the way between his history aspirations and hysteric inclinations until just before the buzzer sounds. The bets are currently on his backing a compromise proposal put forth by coalition Knesset members Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel to postpone the legal budget deadline, gaining two months before the government’s possible demise. After that, no one can really tell.