Erdogan’s boycott call against France more grandstanding than economic threat

French officials rejected Erdogan’s claim of a boycott of Turkish goods in France and also ruled out retaliation, asserting they would maintain ties with Turkey. 

At home, a combination of factors, including the nature of Turkish-French economic links and the pressing grievances of the Turkish public, seem to preclude the prospect of a consequential boycott. A large part of the populace lacks the motivation to join such a protest, overwhelmed by day-to-day livelihood struggles that fuel exasperation with the government. Moreover, the goods of many French brands are manufactured in Turkey, so boycotting them would mean undermining their local production — something that few would be eager to do at a time when the army of jobless is growing. 

Turkey has recently become a net exporter in its bilateral trade with France, meaning that it exports more than it imports, unlike earlier periods. In 2013-2019, for instance, Turkey’s exports to France averaged $7 billion per year, while its imports were worth some $8 billion. In 2019 and in the first eight months of 2020, the trend reversed, with Turkey’s exports exceeding its imports by $1 billion on a yearly basis. 

Yet the main factor that puts Turkey on par with France is its half-century partnership with French car-making giant Renault. Remarkably, the Turkish side in this key partnership is OYAK, the pension fund of the Turkish military.

OYAK holds a 49% stake in the joint venture, while the majority 51% stake belongs to the Renault-Nissan group. The OYAK-Renault Automobile Plants in Turkey manufacture and export Renault’s passenger cars, engines and other mechanical parts. The company is Turkey’s leading car manufacturer, contributing nearly 35% of the car production in the country last year. OYAK-Renault is also Turkey’s top automobile exporter, with about 300,000 cars sold overseas in 2019. MAIS, another branch of the partnership, is active in the retail and after-sale services of automobiles and light commercial vehicles at home, while other joint companies operate in the fields of car financing and rentals. MAIS is the leading passenger-car seller in Turkey, with more than 78,000 sales last year. The Renault car brand has remained the favorite of Turkish consumers for two decades. 

Textiles, clothing, cement and concrete stand out as other major products that Turkey supplies to France through joint ventures. 

According to Turkish Central Bank data, French investments in Turkey totaled $5.3 billion at the end of 2019, accounting for some 5% of the $100 billion European investments in the country. Of note, French investments represented 15% of European investments in 2002, the year the AKP came to power. That share has declined over the years, though the total has more than doubled to $5.3 billion from $2 billion. 

A significant number of Turks continue to work at Turkish-French facilities and related commercial and service businesses, and a significant part of what they produce is being sold to France.

As for the tourism sector, foreign visitors from France totaled 875,000 last year, accounting for about 2% of the 45 million foreigners visiting Turkey. The number represents a downtick in terms of percentage. In 2004, for instance, the nearly 550,000 French visitors made up 3% of the 17 million foreigners who traveled to Turkey. Nevertheless, the French retain their importance for the Turkish tourism industry. 

All in all, the boycott call is unlikely to generate much support in an economic setup that relies prominently on French capital, investment and consumption, especially at a time when vital livelihood issues are plaguing the Turks.